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POLITICS, ADMINISTRATION AND PERFORMANCE:  A CONTINUING SEARCH BUT NO ONE 
BEST WAY? 
1. Introduction 
I have been tasked with the following question:  how do relations between politics and 
administration shift when performance-improving reforms are introduced?  As always, there 
is more than one way of interpreting the question, and of trying to answer.  There are also 
strong normative aspects – for example, who should lead performance reforms, politicians 
or administrators?  I will address this complexity by offering a number of different 
perspectives on performance management, and by making copius references to relevant 
work by scholars in many countries.  Thus, for example, I will look at what we know of past 
performance-oriented reforms; at why a particular reform may work well in one context but 
not in another; at how relations between politicians and administrators have been shifting 
over the past few decades, and at what impacts current conditions of austerity may be 
having on these key relationships.  Throughout I will also be emphasizing a paradox – that 
we have a huge literature on these issues, and yet this mountain of words leaves us without 
any clear or sure general answer.  I attempt to show why generalisations are so difficult, and 
what kind of answers we may be able to develope once we abandon the perenially seductive 
idea that there is, if only we can find it, ’one best way’. 
2. Clearing the conceptual  ground 
Before we can begin our analysis there is a need to define some of our key terms.  In 
particular, we need to be clear what we mean by politician, administrator and  performance.  
The paper focuses mainly on executive politicians – ministers and others who wield 
executive authority.  Among all the various types of public servant it focuses principally upon 
senior advisers to executive politicians, and on top managers (e.g. chief executives of 
operating agencies).  It recognises, however, that, even if some very common features of 
political behaviour can be recognised across many countries, the detailed expectation of 
political roles vary a good deal from one state to another.  Thus the role of a minister in a 
powerful, centralized, one party government like the UK’s is different from that in a 
relatively weak, multi-party government such as has prevailed recently at the federal level in 
Belgium – as, indeed, it is also different from the role of a minister in one of Denmark’s 
typical minority coalitions, or in a short-lived government in Latvia or Romania (Bekke et al, 
1996; Heclo, 1978; Hood and Lodge, 2006; Kettl et al, 2004; Peters, 2006; Peters and Pierre, 
2004; Pollitt, 2009; Schröter, 2004).  The implication, of course, is that what politicians will 
seek and require from their senior civil servants will also differ.  Just as there is no standard 
legal definition of a civil servant that fits all countries - or even all western European 
countries - neither is there a common set of normative expectations about what the 
relationships should be between civil servants and political power.  This ‘public service 
bargain’ (PSB) between the political power and the bureaucratic power varies a great deal 
from one country to another (Hood and Lodge, 2006).  One basic distinction is between 
those systems in which civil servants is primarily regarded as ‘trustees’ of the public interest, 
guardians and representatives of the state, and those other systems where civil servants are 
primarily regarded as ‘agents’ of their political masters.    Therefore, when asking what 
effects performance- or austerity-driven reforms are likely to have on relations between 
politicians and administrators we have to recognise that the starting point for these 
relations looks very different in different countries. 
Next, we come to performance.  Here lie some crucial conceptual distinctions.  Performance 
is a loose and very general term that has been used with an endless variety of specific 
meanings.  It has been deployed to encompass, inter alia, economy, efficiency, effectiveness, 
equity, quality, accountability, transparency and responsiveness.  In the context of this paper 
we need to focus on some more specific elements 
Economising (making economies) is quite different from increasing efficiency (and wholly 
different from improving service quality).  In essence, economies are reductions in inputs 
while efficiencies are improvements in the ratio between inputs and outputs (where outputs 
are what the organization delivers to society, such as grants, licenses, monetary benefits, 
education or healthcare treatments).  Increasing efficiency may therefore even sometimes 
entail an increase in inputs – if that produces a proportionately larger increase in outputs.  
Effectiveness is different again, usually meaning the degree to which the objectives of a 
policy or programme are in fact achieved – so this concerns impacts on the outside world 
beyond the organization itself – real outcomes (Pollitt and Dan, 2011).  Economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness are mutually independent - an increase or decrease in one by no means 
automatically leads to an increase or decrease in the others, in fact it is not unusual for them 
to move in opposite directions.  In this paper I will take ‘performance’ to mean all three:  
economy, efficiency and effectiveness - the famous ‘3Es’- but I will not spend much time 
looking at other dimensions (e.g. equity, quality) which have, by some, been included within 
the concept of performance. 
3. Performance improvements in the past 
The literature on performance improvements is vast.  I can do no more here than provide a 
brief overview of selected – and I hope significant - recent studies.  One immediate problem 
is that, while there is a mountain of studies of performance management and measurement, 
there is only a molehill of studies of the effects these processes have on the 
administrator/politician interface. 
Several recent research projects across Europe have shown that hard evidence for large 
scale performance improvements has often been thin.  One database of more than 500 
studies of NPM reforms across the EU indicates performance improvements in only 40-60% 
of cases, and actual deteriorations in a significant minority - see Table 1 below.   
Type of impact Entries (n) Improved Worse Unchanged 
Outcomes 57 44% 23% 33% 
Outputs 163 53% 20% 27% 
Processes/activities 639 58% 19% 23% 
 
Table 1: Database entries for NPM reform impacts (source: Pollitt and Dan, 2011).  
Note: Studies may contain (and in some cases have contained) more than one entry for 
processes/activities, outputs or outcomes or any combination of these. Therefore an entry is 
not the same as a study. At the point at which this Table was composed the database 
contained 518 studies, comprising 68% academic studies and 32% official studies of one kind 
or another, plus management consultancy reports and studies by civil society organizations.  
For full details see Pollitt and Dan, 2011, on www.cocops.eu 
 
Outcomes, of course, are crucial to effectiveness (see discussion in previous section). 
Outputs are one half of the efficiency equation (we would need to be able to measure 
changes in outputs against changes in inputs to ascertain efficiency, but in most of these 
studies that is not possible).  Changes in processes/activities are internal reforms which may, 
or may not, lead to changes in inputs and outputs, and therefore, ultimately, to changes in 
efficiency and effectiveness. Note that this database relates only to NPM-type reforms, so it 
is always possible that other types of reform may be more regularly successful and 
predictable.  ‘Performance’ was, however, at the heart of the NPM approach. 
 
Another recent study has shown that, looking across 18 EU states, contracting out does not 
seem to be positively associated with long term savings.  It found that ‘outsourcing was not 
associated with a reduction in the public sector size as regards expenditure and 
employment, either in the short or long term’ (Alonso et al, 2011, pp27-28).  Unfortunately, 
this study was based on aggregate data which did not permit much causal analysis.  The 
authors speculated that the result might be due to high transaction and co-ordination costs.  
This study was also unable to comment one way or the other on possible efficiency gains, 
but we will come to those in a moment. 
If we turn to the conclusions of a major, 30 country study of agencification the message is 
similarly cautious (Verhoest et al, 2012).  After large surveys in 30 countries, backed up by 
interviews and documentary analysis the authors came to the conclusion that: 
‘[A]ctual research into agency performance is scarce and empirical evidence of such 
effects is still inconclusive...Also, based on our research, there is no indication that 
autonomy automatically leads to good performance; there are many different 
factors that play an important role’ (Van Thiel et al, 2012, p430). 
 
Next, we might mention the findings of a statistical analysis by Andrews (2011) of claims that 
competition-oriented management reforms had improved efficiency.  Reviewing the 
available quantitative studies, he found roughly equal chances of positive effects and no 
measurable effect at all, although the chances of negative effects were considerably smaller 
than either positive or no change. 
 
Finally, we take note of some UK studies, focused on the economies and the efficiency gains 
that were supposed to have accrued from the famous efficiency drives under the 
premierships of Thatcher, Major and Blair.  Careful scholarship, working with the official 
statistics, indicates that Thatcher’s economies were far less impressive that is popularly 
supposed (Dunsire and Hood, 1989) and that the efficiency gains inside particular 
departments under successive governments were sometimes non-existent (e.g. Dunleavy 
and Carrera, 2011).  The running costs of UK civil departments actually rose 1980-2000.  It is 
true that, over the same period, Total Managed Expenditure (programme spending) 
increased enormously, but even relative to these expenditures, total running costs only fell 
by roughly 1% (Hood and Dixon, 2012).  
 
Several studies of ‘post NPM’ style reforms, including major IT schemes, have also found 
that gains are absent or hard to detect.  For example, a recent National Audit Office analysis 
of the post-NPM programme for efficiency savings through ‘joined-up’ shared service 
centres found that the planned savings of £159M had actually turned into a net increase of 
£255M (National Audit Office 2012; see also http://whitehallwatch.org/2012/03/07), and an 
earlier study by Dunleavy et al (2006) identified many failures with government IT schemes 
in several countries. 
 
On the other hand, some detailed statistical studies of the UK performance target regimes in 
healthcare and education 1997-2007 have shown that they had very significant effects in 
improving targeted performance (e.g. Kelman and Friedman, 2009; Propper et al, 2008; 
Wilson and Piebalga, 2008). However, these gains were made under very specific conditions, 
which would be hard to reproduce in many other countries.  A powerful, majoritarian central 
executive was able to impose strong and detailed target regimes on health and education 
(and other) authorities throughout the country, to publicize successes and failures, and 
often to punish failure quite severely (Barber, 2007; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009; Pollitt et al, 
2010) 
Overall, therefore, we have a great deal of information about past performance 
improvement schemes (including some very successful ones) but it is hard to distill any 
general rules of best practice that will travel easily from one context to another.  What is 
quite clear, however, is that the evidence for large scale success using NPM-type 
mechanisms (contracting out, agencies, performance-related pay, performance targets) is 
rather weak – even in those countries where the conditions for NPM seemed to be most 
favourable.  Furthermore, the emerging picture for post-NPM-type reforms is by no means 
automatically better. 
The existing literature does not indicate that the introduction of performance management 
systems has usually had major consequences for relations between politicians and 
administrators, largely, perhaps, because this has not been a focus for most of these studies.  
In some countries the autonomization of tasks into arms-length agencies has led to anxieties 
about the loss of political steering capacity (Verhoest et al, 2012) , but in general the 
evidence – from many countries – calls into question whether most politicians have really 
taken much systematic interest in the new flows of performance information (Johnson and 
Talbot, 2007; Pollitt, 2006).  What there is much clearer evidence for, however, is that the 
introduction of performance management systems has a variety of effects on the relations 
between different parts of the public service - especially between operational staff and 
professional service deliverers on the one hand and central units responsible for setting 
targets and assessing their achievements on the other (Barber, 2007; Pollitt et al, 2010). 
4. The importance of context 
The preceding brief review of the literature makes it obvious that any serious analysis of the 
likely effects of performance management will have to take into account a number of 
contextual factors.  It is not a question of whether performance targets, or performance 
budgeting, or whatever, work, rather it is a question of in what contexts do they prove more 
or less effective (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Pawson, 2002).  But what are the contextual 
factors that should be taken into account? 
The meta analysis of studies of European NPM reforms referred to earlier gives some clues 
(Pollitt and Dan, 2011).  It picks out a number of contextual features which are reported in a 
wide range of studies.  These are summarized in Table 2 (see annex at end of paper).  These 
features are very various.  Some - such as cultural features or basic patterns of political 
institutions - are usually deeply embedded in a particular national or sectoral system.  
Realistically, they cannot be changed in weeks or even months – reformers have to manage 
them and live with them.  On the other hand, they are predictable – anyone with local 
knowledge and experience can anticipate when and how they will be encountered.  Other 
contextual factors are far less predictable, but may also have shorter-term effects – such as 
accidents or scandals, or particular election results.  There may also be significant short-term 
effects from the rise or fall of particular individual leaders.  Somewhere between these two 
sets of factors lie important medium gauge factors such as administrative capacity – this can 
be changed by vigorous recruitment and training reforms, but tangible results are likely to 
take a year or more to accrue. 
In short, influential contextual factors can be long term or quite sudden, and they can be 
cultural, institutional, political, technical or having to do with individual agents (charismatic 
leaders, scandals, etc).  Therefore many of these can be foreseen or predicted, but some 
cannot. 
5. Performance improvements in the new age of austerity 
In many EU states the current dominant imperative is to reduce public spending.  Economy is 
paramount.  However, undiluted economy, on its own, is not a popular programme, either 
for the general public (a future of unending service reductions) or for public servants 
themselves (the majority of whom work in delivery tasks).  Politicians in most countries have 
therefore been keen to ‘sugar the pill’ by insisting that money-saving reforms can be crafted 
in ways that will nevertheless preserve or even improve service quality, efficiency and 
effectiveness.   Much stress is being placed on new ways of working and on ‘innovation’. This 
is a difficult argument to balance (and to evaluate).  On the one hand new ways of working 
are undoubtedly part of the solution, and one of the main hopes for performance 
improvement under conditions of austerity.  But on the other it is easy to exaggerate the 
extent to which we understand innovation and can channel or manage it (Bekkers et al, 
2011; Edgerton, 2007).  Furthermore, it may be that even with considerable innovation, the 
sheer scale of required expenditure reductions is so great that innovation will not entirely 
offset the need for service cuts. 
To be optimistic, there are past cases where national governments were able to achieve 
major spending reductions which were politically difficult, but not disastrous (e.g. Canada, 
Netherlands, Sweden).  There seem to be a number of ingredients here, including creating 
public understanding of the nature of the problem, the skillful advancement of arguments 
for burden-sharing, and the holding-out of some longer term vision of a return to less 
austere times, plus, of course political courage (Posner and Blöndal, 2012).  There also 
seems to be evidence that political fragmentation, the repeated postponement of ‘pain’ and 
a failure to engage the broad public in the debate (so as to try to disguise and obscure the 
extent of the necessary cuts), tend to lead to public policy disasters and a loss of 
government legitimacy.  There may alos be a danger that, as incremental reductions of 
service quality occur, performance measurement systems may be dismantled or weakened 
by either staff and/or politicians, so that unwelcome results are obscured, not recorded or 
not published.  In the UK, for example, alongside deep cuts in public expenditure some 
Conservative politicians have spoken of the need to be free of heavy bureaucratic 
measurements systems, and have applauded the idea of a ‘bonfire of targets’. 
6. Politicians and administrators – already on the move 
The great pressures that erupted with the global financial meltdown of 2007-8 did not impact on a 
static set of relationships between politicians and administrators.  As many analysts have recognized, 
political roles have been changing for decades now.  In particular, increasing electoral volatility, 
declining perceived legitimacy and a transformation of the nature and intensity of media scrutiny of 
politicians have made their jobs more difficult than they used to be in the immediate post war 
period. Second, what civil servants are expected to be has changed and continues to change.  At 
least two internationally quite widespread trends can be noted.  However, the patterns are complex, 
and there is no one best way or one single point towards which all national systems are converging.  
The first of trend has been the changing nature of executive politics, and, in particular, its increased 
volatility.  Executive politicians in many countries face a situation in which mass voter party loyalty 
has declined (‘party dealignment’) while media scrutiny of their day-to-day decisions (and non-
decisions) has increased in both volume and aggression.  At the same time the old ‘gentlemen’s club’ 
style of politics has given way to populist smears and personal attacks (Kettl et al, 2004, Obama, 
2007, pp9-11).  So executive politicians can rely less on loyal followers to vote for them come what 
may and they simultaneously experience a daily inquisition from a hydra-headed media which 
demands transparency but shows them little respect.   No wonder they want more media-savvy 
protection and more politically-tuned, instantly available advice (for a good flavour, see BBC 2007a 
and b)   
A widely-spread (though not universal) perception by politicians is that the traditional career civil 
servant is somewhat unlikely to satisfy this particular need.  The career bureaucrat is often 
stereotyped as slow-moving and more concerned with procedural rectitude than with the minister’s 
television interview later this evening.  “The capacity of the Civil Service, to deal with the pressures 
of modern government, is much less than it needs to be” (Charles Clarke, senior cabinet minister in 
the Blair administration, BBC 2007b).  Politicians therefore turn to a range of other providers – to 
public relations experts, loyalists from party think tanks, political enforcers, management 
consultants, even film stars or TV journalists.  And once this begins there is a kind of snowball effect 
– other parties or other governments notice and think ‘well, maybe we should do that too’.  
Sociologists and public administration scholars call this ‘isomorphism’ or ‘convergence’ (Pollitt, 
2002).  Soon having more political advisers becomes the ‘modern thing to do’. 
The formal, legal status of these newcomers – the political advisers and public relations experts – 
varies from one system to another.  In the UK, for example, they are often officially designated as 
civil servants.  But both they and the permanent civil servants know that they are different – their 
loyalties, their incentives and the basis of their authority all mark them out from the traditional 
career civil servant.  In other systems they are located in politicians’ personal cabinets – as in the 
French government or the European Commission.  In the USA they form a ‘government of strangers’ 
perched on top of the career civil service like the icing on the cake (Heclo, 1977).  Note, however, 
that in all these cases they are political advisers and analysts and sometimes enforcers, not elected 
political representatives.  They are public servants who have political skills and who are part of the 
political process, but they are not, themselves politicians.  We cannot vote them out, so we need 
other rules for controlling their conduct. 
The second trend - which often occurs in parallel - is that there is an increased stress on the need for 
management skills and attitudes.  Senior civil servants are expected to become professional 
managers, capable of driving through change and stimulating innovation.  These expectations are 
backed up not just by new training, but also by new recruitment and promotion criteria, changes in 
tenure, competency schemes, performance related pay, appraisal systems and all the paraphernalia 
of modern management (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, pp87-96).  Often a greater emphasis is put on 
extrinsic rewards – pay and promotion will go to those who hit their targets and most closely and 
visibly fulfill the minister’s requirements.  [The 2007 return of performance related pay in the US 
federal departments of Homeland Security and Defence appears to mark the triumph of hope over 
experience, since PRP schemes have very seldom achieved clear success, either in the US or any 
other public sector - see Perry et al, 2009] 
Much of this new apparatus is probably useful, and even overdue.  Some of it, however, creates a 
further confusion or tension for senior civil servants.  As Moynihan argues, the extrinsic-rewards 
model: 
 ‘also damages public service motivation in two ways: (1) through a selection effect, by 
attracting and retaining those with primarily extrinsic motivations; and (2) through an 
incentive effect, by crowding out intrinsic motivations’ (Moynihan, 2008, p248) 
Furthermore this change, like the first one, is subject to the amplifying effects of international 
fashion/isomorphism.   
There is a connection between the two trends, and it is a contradictory one.  It is that, to some 
extent at least, politicians’ desire for more loyal political protection and partisan advice is provoked 
by the growth of managerialism (Peters and Pierre, 2004).  NPM-style changes have, in a number of 
countries, led to a proliferation of decentralized or contracted-out services run by professional 
managers who enjoy a degree of autonomy from the political process (Verhoest et al, 2012).  This 
has reduced the range of ‘levers’ which executive politicians can pull, and ‘politicization…was one of 
the more important of the strategies adopted to achieve that end of control’ (Peters and Pierre, 
2004, p284). 
Thus several things come about – either gradually or suddenly.  First, a politicized wedge is driven 
between the career civil service and the political executive (or, in already-politicized regimes such as 
the USA or Italy, or Germany, the existing wedge gets bigger – Derlien, 2004; Peters, 2004; Ongaro, 
2009).  Second, a cadre that was previously focused on giving policy or legal advice now finds itself 
expected to manage.  All of which suggests to senior civil servants that the terms of their previous 
understanding with ministers - their ‘bargain’ - are shifting (Hood and Lodge, 2006).  What had been 
largely taken for granted is now a source of uncertainty, and up for re-negotiation. 
Of course these several developments are not the only problems, and neither are these problems 
present to the same degree in each and every country.  There are also some very practical issues 
around pay and image (see, e.g. Rimington, 2009).  Yet politicization plus managerialism do seem to 
be major factors in unsettling relations between politicians and senior career civil servants in a 
number of countries.  To some extent they push civil servants in opposite directions.  On the one 
hand they are expected to become responsive agents, quickly and sensitively assisting the minister 
through the swiftly changing political tides.  On the other, they are asked to be professional 
executive managers, applying modern techniques in a systematic and expert way, in order to get the 
optimal performance out of public sector organizations.  Further, major problems can easily arise 
when civil servants are asked to behave in more entrepreneurial or innovatory ways but the political 
framework within which these new behaviours are to take place has not been clearly defined and 
firmly settled (for a vivid early example, see Lewis, 1997). 
7. The current era of austerity:  impacts of on the relationships between politicians and 
administrators 
In the current crisis different EU states have started from different positions, in several important 
respects: 
 Type of political system 
 Nature of Public Service Bargain (PSB) between executive politicians and top public servants 
 Make-up of the national economy (e.g. the finance sector and the housing sector are both 
proportionately large in the UK) 
 Level of stress in public finances 
 Perceived legitimacy of the public sector (e.g. much higher in Denmark than Romania, or 
even the UK) 
These and other features mean that different strategies will appeal in different degrees to different 
governments.  For example, one important recent strand of research has suggested that there are 
currently at least four strategies in play among OECD countries (Lodge and Hood, 2012): 
1. The directing state (technocratic attempts to direct and organize one’s way out of the crisis – 
the state forms and implements a strategic plan for solving fiscal, social and organizational 
problems) 
2. The hollow state (an intensification of business-friendly, New Public Management-type 
responses – large scale privatization, contracting out and stripping-down of the remaining 
public sector core) 
3. The communitarian state (localism, decentralization, greater participation and local self-
sufficiency) 
4. The coping state (trying to keep the status quo as far as possible, but with many cut backs 
and diminutions of the security and privileges of the public service) 
Each of these approaches carries different implications for relations between politicians and 
administrators.  In particular each implies certain competences that politicians will expect from 
administrators, each also has implications for the rewards that administrators are likley to receive 
for their work, and each may have a particular effect on the nature of the bond of trust and loyalty 
which exists between the two groups.  Performance management probably has a role in all four, but 
it is clearly absolutely central to the first two. 
Whilst no state fits exactly and exclusively into just one of the four approaches, some states do 
exhibit distinct tendencies in one direction or another.  A few examples may illustrate this. In the 
second half of the twentieth century, all four Nordic states operated in a predominantly ‘directing’ 
mode, at least in the sense that governments readily assumed very wide responsibilities for welfare, 
employment and social security. In a somewhat different way, France was also a strong, directing  
state, famous for its technocratic centralized planning.   
The federal government of the US, however, became more and more ‘hollowed out’. By 2002 
contract employees represented 62% of the combined total of civil service, military and contractee 
positions (Durant et al, 2009; see also Peters 2010).  Even in military matters, the ‘contract state’ 
grew and grew. By the end of the tenure of Secretary of State for Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 
December 2006, there were approximately 100,000 private contractors in Iraq – almost as many as 
there were active duty U.S soldiers (Ricks, 2007, p371, see also Scahill, 2007).  
However surprising this might seem to continental European audiences, it might be argued that the 
state was still in control.  After all, did not Department of Defense write the contracts and pay the 
contractors?  Unfortunately matters were not so simple.  As Scahill and others have made clear, the 
very rapid growth of contracted out military activities was not just an efficient response to functional 
pressures, but rather the product of a new ideology, the ‘Rumsfeld doctrine’, according to which the 
Pentagon should: 
‘draw heavily on the private sector, emphasize covert actions, sophisticated weapons 
systems, and greater use of Special Forces and contractors’ (Scahill, 2007, ppxiv-xv). 
The result of this rapid shift, and of the unexpected levels of resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan, was 
not a neat, efficient or well-ordered system.  Indeed, a 2006 Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
investigation noted that the Army and Air Force were unable to provide information concerning the 
number of contractors they were using at deployed locations, or a full list of the services being 
supplied.  The GAO concluded that: 
‘problems with management and oversight of contractors have negatively impacted military 
operations and unit morale and hindered DOD’s ability to obtain reasonable assurance that 
contractors are effectively meeting their contract requirements in the most cost-efficient 
manner’ (Government Accounting Office, 2006) 
The UK also seems to be on the road to hollowing out, although it has not yet gone nearly as far as 
the US, and anyway started in a different place.  In the 1960s and ‘70s the central executive, in the 
UK system, was much stronger and less constrained than its American counterpart (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011).  However, since the 1980s the grip of the centre has been loosened by a number 
of factors (Rhodes, 1997).  First, there was the very large scale privatization of state industries and 
services, which, for better or worse, both deprived government of various levers of power and 
reduced or obscured the public accountability of these activities (see e.g. Shaoul, 2004). Second, 
there was, in parallel, large scale contracting out.  This affected many aspects of public services, 
from basics such as catering and cleaning through to core issues such as IT.  In their international 
comparative study Dunleavy et al (2006) found that the UK was among those countries where: 
‘NPM impaired government IT modernization by hollowing out public sector staffs and 
capabilities and bringing new contractually based risks and barriers into cross-government 
policymaking’ (2006, p7). 
Third, there was a rapid and extensive process of creating ’arms-length’ executive agencies, which 
soon employed more than two thirds of the home civil service.  Although in many respects 
moderately successful, this shift did throw up co-ordination problems and in some cases it opened 
wider gaps between policy making and implementation (James et al, 2012).  Fourth, the sheer 
intensity of incessant reform in the UK has produced its own confusion and change-weariness, with a 
significant loss of ’institutional memory’ among core civil servants, and a merry-go-round of 
consultants advising on performance management and re-structuring issues that would once have 
been central to the task of the higher civil service (National Audit Office, 2006; Pollitt, 2007; 2008).  
Finally, current UK coalition government polices appear likely to accelerate hollowing out, as the 
main reform white paper signalled that direct state provision should henceforth be the exception 
rather than the rule (Minister for Government Policy, 2011, especially p29) 
These examples illustrate tendencies characteristic of the first and second approaches.  There is 
insufficient space to say more than a few words about the third and fourth.  Few, if any, EU countries 
seem yet to adopted a full-blooded ’communitarian’ approach.  Despite all the talk – in many 
countries – about decentralisation and localism, the overall tendency, until recently, has been 
towards bigger, more professional local government units (Baldersheim and Rose, 2010).  It is 
possible that, under the impact of austerity, this will change (see, e.g. Minister for Government 
Policy, 2011) but we must wait and see. As for the fourth, ’coping’ approach, at the moment 
countries such as Greece and Portugal are in danger of falling into that category. 
We must now turn back to the fourfold framework and ask what implications each approach might 
have for relations between politicians and administrators in the current period of austerity?  For the 
sake of clarity each approach will be described in quite stark terms – actual practice would, no 
doubt, be far more nuanced. 
1. The directing state. Senior officials will be given strong authority to plan and control.  They 
will therefore need to acquire the relevant skills in strategic planning and operational and 
project management.  This approach favours explicit strategies rather than incremental 
change.  Senior officials will be major ’doers’ (running programmes in infrastructure 
development, employment retraining, financial regulation, targeted assistance to innovatory 
research and development, and so on).  Senior officials will thus enjoy high status, though 
whether as trustees or as agents may vary according to the political system.  The directing 
state will certainly need performance measurement. 
2. The hollow state. Like the directing state, this is a strategic response, but one in which the 
state expresses much less confidence in its own abilities and skills. Performance 
improvement becomes a matter for others rather than public servants themselves.  Senior 
officials will be reponsible for carrying through a programme of mass contracting out and 
privatisation.  They will need to know how to design and supervise multiple contracts, 
measure performance and how to talk business to business.  Because of the general 
assumption that private business is more efficient than direct public provision, it is unlikely 
that public officials will have a very high status, or that their rewards will be remotely 
competitive with those of the private sector.  Special privileges such as strong tenure or final 
salary-based pensions will be diminished or removed.  All this will make it harder and harder 
for politicians to rely on high levels of loyalty from their civil servants.   
3. The communitarian state. The stress will be on joined-up local solutions in the common 
good.  Competencies in mediation and facilitation will therefore be paramount.  It is difficult 
to assess the longer term implications of this option.  On the one hand, local discretion and 
innovation may make public sector jobs more attractive, but on the other discretion and 
innovation may come to seem rather empty if the resource shortage is acute.  There is also a 
danger of competing localities and a loss of the sense that the public service is associated 
with equitable solutions for all citizens.  Unified national systems of performance 
emasurement may well be weakened. 
4. The coping state. An essentially conservative response, cheese-slicing here and there but not 
risking a grand strategic plan.  It might just work for some of the countries which are better-
placed in terms of fiscal soundness, but even there is likely to carry serious consequences for 
public servants.  They may be asked to do increasingly impossible jobs (overloaded, fewer 
resources) whilst simultaneously facing an erosion of their privileges in terms of job security, 
pensions and secure salaries.  Sooner or later this is likely to raise questions of loyalty to the 
system. 
 
8. What about the citizens? 
The changes described in the previous section do not proceed in a vacuum.  They inevitably also 
have effects on citizens’experiences and attitudes to governments and the public services.  Some 
possible effects are the following: 
1. The directing state. The government is seen to be in charge and to have a plan, and is 
therefore in a better position to call for burden-sharing among different groups in society.  
The risk, of course, is that the plan does not appear to be working, so that the initial public 
sense of ’we don’t like this much but we accept that something has to be done’ is gradually 
replaced with ’we have made these sacrifices and still it isn’t working – the government is 
incompetent’.  Trusted systems of performance measurement could play an important part 
here, but not if they are perceived as just ’government propoganda’ (Magee et al, 2003) 
2. The hollow state. The service-using public has less and less contact with public officials, and 
more and more with contractors and sub-contractors.  The longer term legitimacy and 
identity of government may become fragile, especially if privately-provided services appear 
to be no better than their public predecessors, and/or if serious concerns with equity and 
access arise, as they tend to do in mainly market-driven allocations of service.  Once again, 
performance measurement is likely to be one (but only one) important factor in the public 
debate about such issue. 
3. The communitarian state. This is a relatively unknown quantity.  It sounds very citizen-
friendly, but there are clearly risks of geographical inequities increasing, and of a decline in 
the extent to which services are ’joined-up’nationally.  Some states have more experience of 
locally-based, community-run public/private partnerships than others, but overall it is an 
area where there is still a great deal of learning to be done. 
4. The coping state. The main problem here is that there is no clear overall plan of what will 
happen – nothing for the public to identify with (or argue against).  No credible longer term 
vision. The government may easily appear weak and dithering, while what citizens actually 
experience is gradually (or rapidly) deteriorating levels of service offered by what is likely to 
be an increasingly disenchanted body of public service staff. 
 
8 Concluding reflections 
The entire thrust of this analysis precludes the possibility of arriving at any neat ’six steps’ type of 
recommendation.  Instead it emphasizes the crucial importance of a variety of contextual factors 
which can individually, or more often in combination, strongly affect both the fate of any given 
performance-oriented reform and the specific character of relations between politicians and 
administrators. 
However, to argue that there is no single ’one best way’ or ’best practice’ is by no means the same 
as saying that we have no guidance.  As this paper has shown, there are plenty of studies out there 
with thought-provoking conclusions which bear some relevance for politician/administrator 
relationships when performance improvement is the priority.  But the guidance is more a description 
of a landscape than a set of precise directions.  In effect it warns ’look out for this’, ’this hill may be 
too steep to climb’, and ’don’t damage that’  It does not say  ’first on the right, then second on the 
left and then go straight on’.  Neither does it assume that performance management must always be 
a good thing, or that it can always be forced to work. 
Most fundamentally, it warns us not to treat performance management as technical issue, divorced 
from the larger framework of institutions and relationships.  Further, it suggests that most if not all 
the tools of performance management need to be assessed for their suitability to the specific 
context where it is suggested that they should be deployed.  Performance-related pay (PRP), for 
example, tends to work poorly – or even become counter-productive - in contexts where a) political 
patronage determines most senior appointments, b) the bonuses available are only a very small % of 
the total remuneration, c) the work is hard to measure in an objective and widely-accepted way, d) 
there is a lack of managerial capacity in the organization promoting PRP and/or in the organizations 
where it is being implemented, e) real or perceived issues of favoritism and corruption exist (e.g., 
Jeannot and Guillemot, 2010; Makinson, 2000; Marsden and French, 1998; Perry et al, 2009; 
Randma-Liiv, 2005; World Bank, 2001). One implication of this way of thinking is that performance 
reforms need to be led (or at least strongly informed) by ’insiders’ who have an in-depth knowledge 
of the organizations where reforms are to take place.  External consultants can be extremely useful 
but they can seldom substitute for an insider’s knowledge of context. 
 
One element of the terms of reference for this paper was to offer some comments specifically 
relevant to Sweden.  Readers will appreciate, I hope, that I am not an expert on Sweden – I am a 
comparativist who knows just a little about Sweden, so that is the vantage point from which my 
remarks must come.  What I have to say will be necessarily tenative and speculative. 
 
Sweden (and the other Nordic states) have a number of strong advantages in the matter of reform.  
First, the political system itself is stable and broadly consensual – there is no helter-skelter of short-
term governments with violently different ideologies.  Second, the public service is well-trained and 
substantially free from both corruption and large scale political patronage.  It is generally held in 
respect by citizens and politicians alike.  Logically, then, nothing should be done that would 
significantly undermine these (fundamental) advantages.  Third, most parts of the public service 
already have experience of performance measurement, in one form or another.  It is not a new and 
foreign idea (as it sometimes has been in other countries) so ’culture shock’ should be modest and 
there should be a good supply of ’insiders’ with relevant experience.   
 
Furthermore Sweden has already had considerable experience of moderating excessive levels of 
public expenditure, and its macro-economic and demographic situation is not nearly as threatening 
as those of some Mediterranean states or other EU members such as Ireland or Poland (Lodge and 
Hood, 2012).  It has been a strong state and a big state, and remains so, even if it is no longer 
automatically at one extreme of every OECD table, and has practised moderate liberalisation on and 
off for two decades (OECD, 2011).  In terms of the Lodge and Hood typology (section 7 above) it 
could credibly adopt a directing state approach.  On the other hand it is not yet ’hollow’ – it has not 
gone nearly as far as the US federal government, or even the UK in mass privatisation and 
contracting out (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).  So it could perhaps afford to go a little further down 
that road without risking the impotence that hollow states are beginning to realize they have let 
themselves in for.  As for communitarianism Sweden (again like the other Nordics) has a long and 
strong tradition of local government, so is well placed to experiment further with local governance 
and ’joining-up’.  In short, strategically, the basic strength of Sweden’s tradition of governance gives 
it more options than some other states may have, including the possibility of a mixed strategy that 
preserves existing strengths while experimenting with new forms. 
 
Operationally, however, what is challenging is the need to tighten the actual implementation of 
performance management at the same time as making further expenditure savings.  Sweden is one 
of a number of countries where the outward form of a modern performance management system 
has not always produced a real performance-oriented culture, a culture in which operational and 
policy staff alike hold measured performance as central to their roles (Sundström, 2006). 
 
If breathing real life into performance management systems is the aim, then the tentative lessons of 
past reforms might include the following: 
 There is a need to make a case for performance management reform – over and over again 
– to the staff who will have to implement it, and to show that this particular reform is likely 
to deliver changes that are professionally, socially and politically valued.  This will require 
leadership – preferably at both the political and the official levels. 
 There is a need to focus on, first, relevance and, second, fairness.  Many performance 
management schemes have been weakened or resisted because staff could not see how 
they would contribute to the organizational goals which motivated them, or because their 
impacts did not appear to be fair.  This implies a degree of staff participation in the design 
and on-going refinement of the system.  And it takes time. 
 It may well be necessary to form some more explicit linkages between the achievement of 
performance targets and individual careers.  This is a very delicate issue, and needs to be 
tailored to the local task and culture.  Too tight a link, and one slides into a punitive regime, 
which is resisted and disliked by the staff who are subject to it. Too loose, and some staff will 
continue to see performance targets as just a formality, or an ’optional extra’, or something 
imposed from above and not really part of their career (Propper et al, 2008). 
 Building one all-encompassing performance measurement system across the whole public 
sector may be doomed to failure.  Different tasks need to be measured in different ways 
and, beyond that, measurement can play different roles in different types of activity (for a 
classic statement of this see Wilson, 1989; for a specfically Swedish expression of a similar 
idea, see Betäkande av Styrutredningen, 2007). 
 While the logic of paying attention to outcomes is cogent, outcomes are often unsuitable as 
criteria for judgements about the success or failure of particular organizations and groups of 
staff.  Outcomes are frequently influenced by a host of factors, some of which will be beyond 
the control of the managers of particular agencies or ministries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, 
pp143-144; Pollitt and Dan, 2011, pp10-17).  In many cases outputs may provide a better 
basis on which to assess the performance of individual organizations and their staff. 
 Where public tasks are contracted out great attention needs to be given at the contract 
design stage to what the performance reporting requirements and public accountability 
arrangements should be. 
 There is a need to monitor implementation closely over time, not just ’launch and forget’ a 
set of targets or a new scheme.  Many reforms which look weak after six months or one year 
later become more accepted and effective.  Others start well in a blaze of enthusiasm and 
publicity and then wither away.  Without independent monitoring the government cannot 
know what is happening in the medium and longer term 
 
When we come to the political interface the challenge is even greater.  There is a need to convince 
busy politicians that the better performance management will produce something of interest and 
immediate value to them.  In many cases, in many countries, performance information has been 
either ignored or only used opportunistically by politicians.  Even ministers have often sometimes 
shown only lukewarm interest.  So reformers need to ask themselves ’why should this be different 
this time?’  At this point expert opinions seem to diverge.  Some concern themselves with all sorts of 
ways to increase the attractiveness of performance information – new ways of presenting the data, 
new ways of linking it to other issues or events that the politicians are already involved in.  Others 
draw the conclusion that politicians’ use of performance data will always be episodic and 
opportunistic.  They argue that, realistically, performance data is mainly produced by operational 
staff and managers for other managers, and that the best they can hope for is the minister’s 
attention once or twice a year at the results meetings.  From this perspective the most important 
thing is to make the data accurate, up-to-date and trustworthy for managers.  I cannot adjudicate 
between these alternative ways of thinking, except to observe that contextual factors may, once 
again, influence how receptive politicians are to performance data.  Sweden may be one of the 
states where circumstances are not so unfavourable as to make reformers give up hope of engaging 
at least some politicians in evidence-based performance dialogues.  Yet, even if this is so, it will 
remain true that, overwhelmingly, the most regular and systematic use or performance data is by 
managers.  If they are uninterested by, or untrusting of, the data then performance management 
will not work anyway. 
 
Moving back from Sweden to a more general level, I conclude with five very broad observations 
about performance management schemes internationally.  [By ’performance management’ I include 
performance indicators and measurement activities plus the whole array of processes that may or 
may not be connected to them, such as individual appraisal, levels of organizational autonomy, 
and/or budgets.]  First, in the past, many such schemes have failed to show credible positive results, 
although some have been successful.  The historical record is patchy, to say the least.  Second, a 
range of contextual factors appear to account for the high degree of variation - these need to be 
taken firmly into account in any future attempted reforms.  Third, performance management 
nevertheless remains an immensely powerful idea - and not just within NPM thinking - and it is hard 
to see how a modern state could entirely do without it. Fourth, looked at from an international 
comparative perspective, Sweden is one of those countries which is fortunately in a rather strong 
position further to improve its performance management systems but may need a differentiated 
approach, with close attention to the detail of implementation.  Fifth, and finally, to connect back to 
the discussion of politicians and administrators in section 6, it may be that what we are seeing in a 
number of countries is the emergence of a more differentiated higher public service.  One senior 
group will be the policy advisers, policy diplomats and ’fixers’, closely attuned to the day-to-day 
imperatives of the political lives of their ministers.  The other will be top executives, armed with a 
range of modern management skills and techniques (very much including locally-adapted versions of 
performance management) and focused on steering public organizations within increasingly 
complex environments.  The criteria for ’success’ would vary between these two groups.  The 
danger, of course, is that relationships between them could become distant or hostile, so that the 
age-old tensions between policy and implementation would re-emerge in newly destructive forms.  
The challenge is to preserve and promote mutual understanding and co-operation between two 
emerging, and somewhat contrasting, sub-cultures. 
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ANNEX 
Table 2: Contextual influences on public management reforms 
 
Contextual influence 
Scale of 
influence 
Time needed to 
achieve change 
Direction (supports or inhibits 
NPM) 
Examples Comments 
1. Politico-administrative 
culture 
National, 
sectoral 
Medium to long 
term  
Studies of countries with a 
Rechtsstaat administrative 
tradition have typically found 
politico-administrative culture to 
inhibit NPM-type reform. Post-
communist cultures (CEE), for 
example, may allow the reform to 
take place but subvert its 
implementation 
Brunetta, 2009; 
Capano, 2003; 
Lægreid et al., 
2008; Nemec, 
2007; OECD, 
2010; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011;  
Torres and Pina, 
2004 
The politico-administrative 
culture in a number of 
countries in CEE and 
elsewhere in Europe (e.g., in 
Italy or Spain) has often been 
characterized by excessive 
legalism, low citizen trust and 
confidence in the public 
sector, poor satisfaction with 
civil servants, lack of 
transparency and  issues of 
patronage and corruption.  
2. Structure of the 
political system (e.g., 
centralized/decentralized
; 
majoritarian/consensual) 
 
National Medium to long 
term 
Supportive or inhibiting of NPM-
type reforms, depending on the 
characteristics of the political 
system 
Askim et al., 
2010; 
Christensen, 
2001; Minvielle, 
2006; Norges 
Forskningsråd, 
2007; Pollitt et 
al., 2004; Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 
2011; Roberts, 
1997 
Major differences exist 
between the incremental 
decision-making process (in 
e.g., Germany or Norway) 
compared to the majoritarian 
and centralized political 
system in the UK. The latter 
facilitates the implementation 
of rapid and large-scale 
reforms.  
3. Rapid turnover of 
governments and/or 
rapid change in 
governmental structures 
and functions and 
ministerial appointments 
National, 
sectoral, 
ministry-level 
or 
organizational 
This can be short 
term, but more 
often it is a 
medium term 
pattern of 
government 
instability 
Tends to reduce the continuity and 
coordination of reform efforts in 
time or across government 
Dunleavy and 
Carrera, 2011; 
Meyer-Sahling, 
2009; Verheijen, 
2007, p. xvi 
A particularly common factor 
in CEE, but not exclusively a 
CEE problem (see e.g., 
Dunleavy and Carrera for an 
example of the UK Department 
of Work and Pensions). The EU 
accession efforts in Romania 
and in other CEE countries are 
often said to be a main driver, 
accepted by parties across the 
political spectrum. This helped 
to improve the continuity of 
reform efforts in the pre-
accession period, despite 
government changes.  
4. Lack of current 
administrative capacity 
(e.g., weak or inadequate 
contract management 
skills, strategic planning 
skills or leadership skills) 
 
National,  
sectoral or 
organizational 
Medium term – a 
long-standing skill 
deficit will take 
resources and 
typically years 
rather than 
months to 
remove 
Potentially severely inhibiting of 
reform.  May mean that reform 
cannot be ‘rolled out’ but can only 
be implemented in a few specially 
resourced and staffed model 
projects 
Baggott, 1997; 
Edelenbos and 
Klijn, 2009; 
Hammerschmid 
et al., 2011; 
Kuhlmann et al., 
2008; Lember, 
2008; Macinati, 
2000; Meyer-
Sahling, 2009; 
NAO, 2009; 
Nemec, 2008; 
Promberger, 
2008; Randma-
Liiv, 2005;  
Verheijen, 2007; 
Verhoest, 2005;  
Common in CEE countries. 
However, this factor was also 
found to be important in a 
number of countries in the 
West, including the UK and 
Germany. Experience of 
working closely with the 
private sector and the 
possession of leadership skills 
have been found to be 
positively associated with good 
performance.  
Yesilkagit and De 
Vries, 2002 
5. Socio-demographic 
characteristics of 
geographical areas, 
service users or citizens  
Regional or 
local 
Usually medium 
to long term.  The 
socio-
demographic 
characteristics of 
particular 
localities do 
change, but 
usually not 
overnight. 
Particular user characteristics may 
help or hinder NPM-type reforms.  
In education, for example, simple 
versions of parent choice tend to 
advantage the more mobile, 
better-informed middle class 
families 
Andersen, 2008; 
Wilson and 
Piebalga, 2008; 
Atun et al., 2005 
The performance of students 
in the Danish public school 
system, for instance, has been 
influenced more by their socio-
economic status than by the 
introduction of performance 
measurement (Andersen, 
2008). 
6. Need for non-standard 
individual treatments of 
service delivery (i.e. the 
task itself is complex and 
variable) 
Organizational 
and 
sometimes 
sectoral 
In so far as this 
need is 
embedded in the 
structure of the 
task, it may well 
be difficult to 
change in the 
short term. It 
sometimes alters 
with 
technological 
change in the 
longer term. 
Typically at odds with the NPM 
focus on standardization in order 
to achieve efficiency and quality 
control. Potentially leading to 
major distortions and user 
dissatisfaction with the service  
Harrison and 
Pollitt, 1994; 
Matelly and 
Mouhanna, 2007; 
Pollitt at al., 
1998b; Pollitt et 
al., 2004 
Particularly relevant to social 
and human services. The NPM 
focus on rapidity and efficiency 
in service delivery was found 
to negatively affect users’ 
satisfaction with the service in 
sectors such as employment 
services (Divay, 2009), 
hospitals (Belorgey, 2010) and 
police (Matelly and 
Mouhanna, 2007). Problems 
include professional resistance 
to loss of discretion, plus 
possible gaming of 
performance measurement 
systems.  
This is a particularly salient 
factor in the French NPM 
literature, but also occurs 
elsewhere.  
7. International (external) 
pressure for reform 
International 
(though it may 
be focused on 
specific 
organizations 
or sectors) 
Short to medium 
term 
Supportive of reform – though not 
necessarily the most appropriate 
types of reform.  Relaxation of 
international pressure may result 
in a weakening of the reform 
programme (Meyer-Sahling, 2009) 
Arndt, 2008; 
Meyer-Sahling, 
2009; Nemec and 
Kolisnichenko, 
2006; Pollitt, 
2010 
Pressure from the World Bank 
and the IMF, for instance, for 
market-type healthcare reform 
in a number of CEE countries 
proved influential but 
misplaced since these 
countries were unprepared for 
such reforms. 
8. Organized resistance 
from stakeholders 
 
National, 
sectoral or 
local 
Short to medium 
term 
Inhibiting or possibly preventing 
NPM-type reforms 
 
For professional 
resistance see  
Harrison and 
Pollitt, 1994; 
Matelly and 
Mouhanna, 2007; 
Pollitt at al., 
1998b; Pollitt et 
al., 2004.  
For union 
resistance see 
Capano, 2003; 
Emery and 
Giauque, 2001; 
Hondeghem and 
Depré, 2005 
Highly qualified professionals 
typically resist the NPM focus 
on standardization. 
Opposition from labor unions 
was a key factor that inhibited 
and even prevented the full 
implementation of the 
Copernicus reform in Belgium 
(Hondeghem and Depré, 
2005).  
 
9. Sudden accidents or 
scandals 
Organizational Short term in the 
sense that they 
are 
unpredictable, 
but may have 
Typically stimulating reform, 
although a major scandal or 
disaster may inhibit or even 
prevent reform 
Bauer, 2009; 
Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011; 
Pollitt et al., 2010 
For example, the scandal 
preceding the Kinnock reforms 
in the EU Commission 
stimulated the decision to 
implement comprehensive 
longer term 
consequences if 
rules and 
structures are 
changed 
reform.  
      
10. Contextual features 
influencing performance 
targets and other 
performance incentives 
National, 
sectoral,  
organizational 
Short to medium 
term 
Performance management 
schemes are likely to yield negative 
results and be unsustainable if 
poorly defined and/or 
implemented in a highly politicized 
context 
Andersen and 
Pallesen, 2008; 
Kelman and 
Friedman, 2009; 
Nemec, 2007; 
Pollitt at al., 
2010; Propper et 
al., 2008 
Particularly relevant to health 
and education, but also to 
employment services. 
Examples have been identified 
in a number of countries 
including the UK, the 
Netherlands, France, Denmark 
and Slovakia. 
11. Contextual features 
affecting  performance-
related pay (PRP) 
National, 
sectoral, 
departmental 
Short to medium 
term 
PRP only works well when 
perceived as supportive, 
motivational, fair and clear.  If 
otherwise it can lead to negative 
consequences, such as lack of 
cohesion, decrease in staff 
collaboration and lowered morale 
Emery, 2004; 
Jeannot and 
Guillemot, 2010; 
Makinson, 2000; 
Marsden and 
French, 1998; 
Randma-Liiv, 
2005; World 
Bank, 2001 
The existence or lack thereof 
of managerial capacity has 
been found to be a critical 
factor. Likewise, political 
patronage, favoritism and 
corruption, small bonuses, the 
difficulty of measuring results 
objectively and the lack of 
legitimacy of the scheme have 
been found to negatively 
affect the effectiveness and 
sustainability of PRP schemes. 
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